Global Studies Review

BY BRIAN FINLAY

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, we face a cruel irony of history — the risk of a nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up. Nuclear materials that could be sold or stolen and fashioned into a nuclear weapon exist in dozens of nations. Just the smallest amount of plutonium — about the size of an apple — could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have tried to acquire the material for a nuclear weapon, and if they ever succeeded, they would surely use it. Were they to do so, it would be a catastrophe for the world — causing extraordinary loss of life, and striking a major blow to global peace and stability. In short, it is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security — to our collective security.

Remarks by US President Barack Obama at the Opening Plenary Session of the Nuclear Security Summit 13 April, 2010, Washington DC

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other advanced military technologies emerged as the preeminent national security concern for the United States and other economically developed countries of the Global North. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 pointedly demonstrated this new cause célèbre by embracing the twin objectives of destroying what turned out to be Saddam Hussein’s phantom nuclear arsenal, and the toppling of his regime. Of course, the war in Iraq was not the only evidence of this growing preoccupation. Concern over Pyongyang’s newly minted nuclear capability and illicit missile technology exports also began to occupy a significant percentage of Western diplomatic and military resources. Elsewhere, the continued enrichment of nuclear materials by Iran, the intensifying nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, the prospect of China as a nuclear “peer competitor,” and elevated concern over terrorist acquisition of the world’s most dangerous weapons all culminated in a 2005 report by the US government Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, that concluded there is a better than even chance that a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon will be used somewhere in the world by the year 2030.¹

These fears of unchecked proliferation are not entirely without merit. As a direct result of the globalized economy, supply chaining, and outsourcing, the ability to contribute to the WMD supply chain has been placed in more hands, in more countries and in more corners of the globe than at any other time in history.² As a result, the ability to innovate, manufacture, transship, or otherwise contribute materially to proliferation can today, be as easily facilitated in Belmopan as in Berlin, as effectively in Luanda as in Los Angeles. Yet as these capacities have spread into regions of the world where nonproliferation governance is often lacking, convincing these governments —particularly in the Global South—to take a more proactive role in proliferation prevention has, not unreasonably, been a significant challenge. Consider this:

• Approximately 790 million people in the developing world are still chronically undernourished, almost two-thirds of whom reside in impoverished regions of Asia and the Pacific.³
• In 2010, a UNESCO study revealed 54.65 million school-age children in the Global South were not enrolled in school, yielding long-term implications for development and enduring challenges to human security.⁴
• From 2004 – 2007, 205,483 people were killed in direct armed conflict in developing countries—primarily with small arms—with  63,758 reported deaths in 2007 alone.⁵

In the face of these far more immediate threats to human security and development, it is unsurprising that there is limited receptivity across much of the Global South to diverting scarce human and financial resources to prevent the seemingly distant threat of WMD proliferation. Western nations rightly fear that the emerging markets of the South may become incubators for proliferation, due to their lack of capacity, and occasionally even their lack of motivation to limit the passage of sensitive materials, technology and know-how across their borders to lucrative markets abroad.⁶

This has created a disconnect between the proliferation fears of wealthy governments, and the rest of the world struggling to manage more immediate concerns. Because of this schism, Western governments have traditionally defined and managed the global nonproliferation agenda—both as project managers and as funders. For decades Western governments considered spending more money, on more equipment, under more programs, in more countries around the globe as critical to addressing the evolving proliferation threat. Budgets often seemed limitless, and government efforts logically grew to address the complexities of a new proliferation reality. And unlike other areas of nondiscretionary government spending, the security sector seemed immune from the cyclical fluctuations of the global economy.⁷

Today, however, a dramatic shift in spending priorities has been precipitated by the global financial downturn. Major nonproliferation donors, while continuing their rhetorical focus on proliferation as a central threat to global security, have reduced, or at a minimum, flat-lined appropriations to international assistance programming. Spending in the form of nonproliferation assistance to the G8 Global Partnership (G8GP), one of the most successful multinational vehicles for leveraging programmatic, financial, and technical support, has undergone dramatic reductions among several key donors. For example, commitments to the G8GP made by the Japanese government effectively stalled in 2010, and to date, no further offers of assistance have been recorded.  Meanwhile, nonproliferation assistance in the United Kingdom has followed an inconsistent but downward trend, with the most significant spending decreases recorded from US$ 172 million (2007-2008) to US$ 19 million (2008-2009). Britain still needs to dedicate nearly US$ 300 million by the end of 2012 to meet its US$ 750 million pledge made in 2002.⁸ As indicative, following a limited extension of the G8GP’s program in 2010, state partners avoided assigning any financial pledges to meet newly expanded commitments. The decision to renew the international program at the most recent leaders Summit in France without a built-in funding framework reflects a growing hesitation on the part of established funders, as well as persisting confusion regarding the size of investment required to address the global nonproliferation challenge.⁹ This, combined with the recalcitrance among many governments of emerging economies to sustainably address the challenges posed by global dual-use technology diffusion, lead some to worry that reduced budgets in an era of expanding threats portends a markedly more dangerous WMD future.

MEETING PROLIFERATION WITH INNOVATION IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
Even despite this trend, Western governments continue to be responsible for the lion’s share of nonproliferation programming and international assistance. But emerging interest among some governments of the developing world has been combined with a more savvy approach to prevention that seeks to satisfy their international obligations to the global regime, while pragmatically pursuing activities that meet seemingly unrelated but higher order priorities ranging from human security to economic development. By disaggregating nonproliferation programming into its component parts, these governments are beginning to recognize that innovative connections can be drawn between the elements of assistance and gaps in the higher priority needs of the partner. For instance:

• Detecting and responding to biological weapons requires a functional disease surveillance network and a robust public health infrastructure;
• Trade expansion and business development cannot occur unless borders and ports are safe, efficient, and secure—also a key component to prevent the physical movement of WMD materials and technologies; and
• Preventing trafficking and illicit trade of humans, conventional arms and drugs relies upon many of the same resources and capacities necessary to detect and prevent nuclear proliferation and combat terrorist activities.

By instituting these dual-purpose programs, developing nations are able to achieve their local goals of building a more stable environment for development, while simultaneously fulfilling their nonproliferation obligations to the global community. The result is more sustainable nonproliferation programming that ultimately costs less. More importantly, it has yielded an array of unique South-South partnerships that have begun to supplant traditional Western-driven models of security engagement. These patterns of investment could indicate an emerging bright spot for global efforts to counter the proliferation threat.

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO PREVENTION
To date, at least three broad categories of partnerships in this discrete security space are evident across the Global South. They are categorized below as: (i) initiatives of the “incipient global leaders,” (ii) collaborations among the “resource challenged,” and (iii) cooperative programs instigated by the “strategically motivated.”¹⁰  The common element underwriting each of these categories is an innovative approach based upon “whole-of government” programming.¹¹ Of course, many governments of the Global South have long practiced a level of interagency cooperation foreign to wealthier governments of the North—more often out of sheer necessity than out of an acute sense of perceived efficiencies. When not redirected by internal corruption, limited financial resources necessarily had to be stretched to maximum effect.

Borrowing initially on Western resources to initiate proliferation prevention activities—from securing borders, to developing relevant legislative frameworks, implementing financial and export controls, and acquiring physical security equipment at sensitive sites or transshipment points—a growing number of emerging economies have indigenized these new capacities. In turn, they have themselves become donors, often to geographically contiguous partners, and just as often with dual-purpose motivation. Not only have these governments helped their partners comply with international nonproliferation standards, but they have also simultaneously built the rule of law, prevented the trafficking of drugs and small arms, contributed to infrastructure modernization, enhanced trade competitiveness, and supported customs and revenue collection.¹² These activities have paid dividends not only to the recipient partners, but also to the donor, and most certainly to the cause of global nonproliferation. As a result, they have been far more sustainable that traditional Western-favored “technology drop” approaches.

INCIPIENT GLOBAL LEADERS
The so-called “BRIC” governments have long been scrutinized for their potential to eclipse the combined economies of today’s wealthiest countries by 2050.¹³ While Western governments have viewed this with some suspicion in terms of overall control of the global economy, the BRIC governments are also showing an interest in seizing a greater share of global security leadership—and contributing innovatively to new South-South security partnerships that meet mutual needs. When combined with “BRIC-lite” governments—those whose economies are performing well, even if not operating at a competitive rate with more economically developed world economies—it is clear that together, these governments have the capacity to re-write traditional approaches to security collaboration. Brazil, Russia, Argentina, Croatia, and China for example, have all expressed a burgeoning interest in nonproliferation cooperation and resource sharing with targeted partners around the globe.¹⁴ They have also shown an interest in “investing” in the security space, rather than “donating” to it.

By way of example, recognizing the long term benefits of a robust export control system for the prevention of all manner of contraband across its national borders—from drugs, to people, to strategic goods—the government of Argentina coordinated a program designed to develop stringent new trade controls, initially to prevent proliferation.¹⁵ Although the focus was purportedly on strategic goods of WMD concern, the program yields benefits for higher priority counter-smuggling efforts, customs collection objectives, and transportation modernization through the use of modern technologies. The program included the development of a standardized national licensing system, the training of law enforcement officials to recognize WMD-related materials and equipment, industry outreach, and significantly, a strategy for regional cooperation and capacity sharing. As such, the effort also paid direct dividends to Argentinian trade and development objectives.

In keeping with its pledge to extend the program on a regional basis, beginning in 2010 Argentina launched a bilateral cooperation initiative with neighboring Peru. The multi-year program has included not only commodity identification training, interagency cooperation across Ministries of Defense, Industry, Foreign Affairs and Justice, but also targeted the training of Peruvian police and border personnel. Furthermore, the Argentine government has also donated a variety of equipment to customs, the Coast Guard, police, border control, and air security agencies in Peru.¹⁶

For both governments, the goal has wisely been to not only better comply with global nonproliferation norms, but to prevent the trafficking in all manner of contraband, and to modernize port and transportation infrastructures. The result is a better leveraging of resources, a more sustainable engagement, and an innovative new South-South approach to proliferation prevention.

THE RESOURCE CHALLENGED
Because of the worldwide economic crisis, governments across the developed world are now glimpsing the fiscally restrained environment that much of the Global South has toiled under for decades. By necessity, dollars must be stretched in innovative ways, forcing better rationalization of resources, and cooperation among disparate government agencies. As noted, many of these “whole-of-government” and even “whole-of-region” approaches have been successfully exercised by cash-strapped governments of the Global South for decades in unrelated areas of national policy.

For instance, in 1973, recognizing the need for better economic and trade coordination, governments of the Caribbean Basin formed the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The goal of the organization was to improve standards of living and increase employment, as well as to develop trade opportunities through expanded political and economic cooperation.

Thirty years later, motivated by the events of 9/11 and revelations of the A Q Khan black market nuclear network, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1540 mandating a series of supply side demands upon all member states designed to ensure the nonproliferation of WMD items to non-state actors. For two years, compliance by governments of the Caribbean region—as with much of the Global South—was marked by either a lack of reporting, or widespread under-reporting of efforts required to fulfill the mandate of the resolution. With an endemic lack of resources, prioritization, and capacity, none of the fourteen governments of the Caribbean Basin could justify the expenditure of new resources on WMD proliferation prevention, despite their Security Council mandate to do so.

Beginning in 2007, however, and in keeping with the regional burden-sharing approach pioneered by CARICOM, the organization not only proposed an innovative collaboration to share regional implementation capacity for 1540 implementation, but has facilitated the hire of a single coordinator to manage each government’s implementation programs. Moreover, the region implemented an electronic Advanced Passenger Information System (eAPIS) establishing a single domestic space across the region. The goal of the initiative is to better screen the movement of people, ships and aircraft in and out of the Caribbean region, reducing the potential for illicit trafficking in all manner of contraband—including weapons or materials of mass destruction.¹⁷ For small economies of the Caribbean, investing individually in these capacities made little sense, but by sharing resources across all fourteen governments, innovative partnerships have been borne out of necessity.

Together, these national efforts have capitalized upon the “dual benefit” aspects of nonproliferation cooperation that equally contribute to economic development, preparedness for natural disasters, public health, counter-trafficking, and infrastructure modernization. As a result, sustained buy-in has been obtained from Caribbean governments that meet both high-priority objectives as well as global nonproliferation obligations.¹⁸ It has also led to a more efficient use of international assistance dollars and a mechanism to bring small, resource-strapped governments into full compliance with global nonproliferation obligations.

THE STRATEGICALLY MOTIVATED
Seldom do the security priorities of governments subsist in a vacuum. Rather, government priorities and agendas are more often identified and set through the complex interaction of economic, security, social, political, and even occasionally individual interests. As noted above, emerging economies rarely have prioritized proliferation prevention due to, inter alia, the competition for attention amidst an array of other more pressing human security and development challenges.

Yet the global nonproliferation regime, along with related security standards embedded in a wide cross section of multilateral arrangements, necessitate the inculcation of WMD preventive capacity for all governments regardless of capacity. Many of these standards have been similarly adopted as criteria for entering regional cooperation blocs. For instance, membership in the European Union (EU) requires member states to comply with and implement all existing international disarmament and nonproliferation treaties, agreements, and other relevant obligations; additionally, members must also establish a system for controlling the export of WMD related goods and dual use technologies.¹⁹  In order for governments to be considered for admission, EU Members must be convinced that the petitioning government is capable of preventing the trafficking of WMD and other contraband across its national boundaries. On this basis, governments seeking admission to the EU for unrelated objectives have been motivated to compliance not by ethereal nonproliferation obligations as defined by the United Nations or by Western security interests, but rather because of direct, if unrelated, economic or political priorities.

For instance, Croatia has pressed for accession to the European Union for almost a decade, beginning with Zagreb’s submission of its membership application in February 2003, and the European Council’s confirmation of its status as a membership candidate in June 2004.²⁰ The government has made clear that EU membership will yield both international visibility, as well as direct national benefits ranging from the promotion of economic development, to cooperative engagements that will help fight endemic crime and violence.

Southeastern Europe has long been identified as a central trafficking route for all manner of contraband flowing westward from Asia: cigarettes, human slaves, narcotics, counterfeit intellectual property, and even nuclear material.²¹ Concern over border security was therefore discussed extensively during membership negotiations between Croatia and the EU.²² Although Zagreb was deemed well prepared for accession and is able to align policies with the EU on matters of foreign security and national defense, it received recommendations to improve efforts on regional cooperation.²³ In a direct effort to promote its admission to the EU, the government has launched an aggressive campaign to not only highlight its compliance with the global nonproliferation regime, but to share these capacities with other states-in-need.

In 2007 the Government of Croatia convened a meeting of regional customs authorities for Southeastern European countries. The meeting centered on explaining customs compliance requirement for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with respect to the declaration of transfers, as well as the role of customs services pertaining to the import/export of sensitive materials. Invited participants included representatives from Pakistan, Qatar, and Belarus, among others.²⁴ The meeting was followed by subsequent information sharing sessions regarding radioactive scrap metal consignments, the training of border security personnel, and equipment installation funded in part by the government of Croatia.²⁵ Zagreb’s reach has also extended beyond its immediate neighborhood. In 2008, in collaboration with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Croatia hosted a training exercise on the implementation of CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), targeting African states. There, the government reiterated its commitment to provide “substantial technical expertise” in eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles to other State Parties of the OPCW that have expressed an interest in engaging in similar eradication programs.

As an emerging economy, Croatia’s impetus to become a nonproliferation “donor” has been motivated by external stimuli. And again, these programs have been approached more holistically, linking expenditures in these areas with related programmatic efforts to prevent proliferation.

In a similar model, again in the Caribbean, the region was selected as the joint host of the Cricket World Cup (CWC) in 2007. The selection of the Caribbean Basin was seen by regional governments as a significant opportunity for economic development. Yet hosting an international sporting event like the CWC entails a broad swath of obligations, including the establishment of discrete security capacities to ensure the safe operation of the games. Some of the requisite security precautions are dual purposed with WMD regime compliance—from specific activities related to WMD detection, to wider security cooperation standards in the event of a mass casualty incident. Motivated strategically by the economic benefits yielded by the games themselves, over the course of a year, the Caribbean as a whole made significant strides toward compliance with both the specific mandate of the Cricket World Cup security agreement, as well as with global nonproliferation standards.²⁶

CONCLUSION
The era of Western-dominated approaches to proliferation prevention has not ended. The Global North remains by far the predominant force for good within the global nonproliferation regime. Yet as the locus of proliferation concern continues to drift southward, and with more innovative approaches practiced by governments of the Global South and other emerging economies that better link government priorities to nonproliferation mandates, the diminished wherewithal of more economically advanced governments of the North to finance the need for capacity building efforts, suggests that a growing proportion of these activities will exclude the traditional donors. Instead, new South-South partnerships represent a growing dynamic that, like similar initiatives in the economic realm, represent a burgeoning desire on the part of these governments to own a greater share of the global agenda.  Rather than considering these as challenges to Western oriented systems, these developments should be welcomed as positive advances that could represent the meaningful inculcation of nonproliferation standards to regions of the world that increasingly find themselves links on a potential proliferation supply chain.

Brian Finlay is the director of The Stimson Center’s Managing Across Boundaries program, which focuses on proliferation, illicit trafficking, and other transnational threats.

 

ENDNOTES

1. Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, December 3, 2008. [↩]
2. Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 12. [↩]
3. “Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems,” World Resources Institute, 2008, accessed July 8, 2011, http://www.wri.org/publications/ecosystems. [↩]
4. “Education for all Global Monitoring Report,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2010, accessed July 8, 2011, http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/gmr10-en.pdf. [↩]
5. “Small arms are weapons of mass destruction,” International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), accessed June 3, 2011, http://www.iansa.org/media/wmd.htm. [↩]
6. See Fitzpatrick, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks. [↩]
7. “GPWG Annual Report 2009 Consolidated Report Data – Annex A,” Global Partnership Working Group, 2009, accessed June 6, 2011, http://www.g8summit.it/static/G8_Allegato/GPWG-Report-2009-AnnexA-Consolidated-Data-Sheets,2.pdf; Martin Matishak, “G-8 Nonproliferation Effort Renewed,” Global Security Newswire, May 31, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110531_4817.php. In total since 2002, more than $19 billion has been invested to meet the perceived proliferation of WMD capable threats. [↩]
8. “Statement by G8 Leaders – The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” G8 Information Centre, Kananaskis Summit, June 27, 2002,http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html. [↩]
9. Martin Matishak, “G-8 Nonproliferation Effort Renewed,” Global Security Newswire, May 31, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110531_4817.php. [↩]
10. It is important to note that these groups are not mutually exclusive, and many of these new partnerships fall into more than one basket. For instance, a government that may be motivated by external stimuli into a South-South “donor” partnership may be equally driven by an internal lack of technical or financial resources that necessitates a better sharing of capacities with like-minded regimes across national borders. Similarly, a government viewing its nonproliferation assistance programming as a measure of its own global leadership may also be motivated by admission into a regional trading bloc, or as the host of an event of international significance necessitating enhanced security precautions such as the Olympics or a summit of political leaders. [↩]
11. “Whole of government denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery.” See “Connecting Government: Whole of government responses to Australia’s priority challenges,” Australian Public Service Commission, accessed online at: http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment1.htm [↩]
12. Brian Finlay, “WMD, Drugs, and Criminal Gangs in Central America: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” Stanley Foundation, 2010,http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/CAprt710.pdf. [↩]
13. “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Global Investment Research, October 2003, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/brics-dream.html. [↩]
14. For a representative sample of government commitments see: Robert Golan-Vilella, Michelle Marchesano, and Sarah Williams, “The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit: A Status Update,” Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report, April 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Status_Report_April_11_2011_WEB.pdf. [↩]
15. Scott Jones and Johannes Karreth, “Assessing the Economic Impact of Adopting Strategic Trade Controls,” U.S. Department of State – Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation – Office of Export Cooperation, December 2010. [↩]
16. Noelia Romero, Homeland Security Secretariat, Ministry of Justice, Security and Human Rights, Government of Argentina, “UNSCR 1540 and Spreading Capacity Building Throughout Latin America,” Remarks to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Facilitation Event for Latin America, November 9-11, 2010. [↩]
17. Personal interview with CARICOM Secretariat UNSCR 1540 Coordinator, O’Neil Hamilton, September 12, 2010. [↩]
18. And similarly, recognizing the economic implications of insecure trade on its national well-being, the government of Panama has invested heavily in a national program designed to prevent terrorist acts, organized crime and acts of proliferation. In an attempt to reinforce its own ability to counter these inherently transnational threats, the Panamanian government has welcomed the sharing of information, capacities and equipment with its regional partners in the Central American Integration System (SICA, the Spanish acronym for Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana). Panamanian collaboration pays direct dividends to sustainability by approaching the threat on the basis of mutual interests, and in escaping perceptions of US regional dominance. Central American Integration System, “The Next 100 Initiative: Responding to UN Security Council 1540 With Development and Capacity Building Assistance in Central America,” unofficial translation provided by the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010, http://1540.collaborationtools.org/sites/default/files/SICA_Concluding_Statement_English_0.pdf. [↩]
19. Council of the European Union, “Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 15708/03, adopted 12 December, 2003,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=718. [↩]
20. “Croatia – EU-Croatia Relations,” European Commission, Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, accessed May 19, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm. [↩]
21. See: Misha Glenny, McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld, New York: 2008, and Andrew Kramer, “Arrests in Moldova Over Possible Uranium Smuggling,” New York Times, June 29, 2011. [↩]
22. “Hungary-Croatia IPA Cross-Border Cooperation Program,” European Commission, Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, p. 10, http://www.mrrsvg.hr/UserDocsImages/OP%20Hungary-Croatia.pdf. [↩]
23. “Screening Report, Croatia: Chapter 31: Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy,” European Commission, Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, June 22, 2007, p. 5,http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_31_hr_internet_en.pdf. [↩]
24. “Custom Authorities Meet in Croatia,” Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, April 26, 2007, accessed June 6, 2011, http://www.opcw.org/news/article/custom-authorities-meet-in-croatia/ [↩]
25. UNECE Group of Experts, “Recommendations on Monitoring and Response Procedures for Radioactive Scrap Metal,” United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, accessed June 6, 2011,http://live.unece.org/trans/radiation/recommendations.html [↩]
26. Interview with O’Neil Hamilton, CARICOM Coordinator for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 31 May, 2011. Also see: Brian Finlay and O’Neil Hamilton, “Sustaining Proliferation Prevention: Gaining Ground In the Global South,” The Stimson Center, February 23, 2011, http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/sustaining-proliferation-prevention-gaining-ground-in-the-global-south/ [↩]

Tags: Global Studies Review Vol. 7 No. 3 Fall 2011

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