The Impacts of Globalization on Tajikistan: New Roles for Conflict Resolution
BY SANDRA I. CHELDELIN AND SUSAN F. HIRSCH
In 2004, in collaboration with a local NGO in Dushanbe, our faculty at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution launched a multiyear project to increase conflict resolution capacities of local actors in Tajikistan. We worked with government, religious and academic leaders, created a conflict resolution resource center and helped Tajikistani faculty develop ten new courses on conflict resolution that are now taught at three universities.
Our work was designed to contribute to post civil-war reconstruction. In the process of doing our work we realized that reconstruction efforts were made more complicated by the effects of globalization both locally and regionally. In this paper we explore two primary post-war issues—resource development and the need to reknit the social fabric of families—that have been exacerbated by globalization and offer suggestions for third party assistance to address these issues. Our new-found appreciation of the role conflict resolution interveners might have in helping Tajiks improve their economy and thereby the quality of life of their citizens includes the realization that the current position of the United States in global politics makes American intervention effective on some issues and questionable on others.
PEACE-BUILDING IN POST-WAR TAJIKISTAN
The story of the civil war in Tajikistan is not dissimilar to many civil wars in terms of both causes and outcomes. Tajikistan declared independence from the former USSR in September 1991. Shortly after a former communist was elected president that same year, opposition citizen groups organized demonstrations to challenge the results. To contain the demonstrators, the elected party armed pro-government militias. On the defensive, opposition parties sought military aid outside the government, in this case, from their southern border Afghani neighbors. A full-fledged multi-layered war erupted by spring of 1992, within the country, region against region, while several of its bordering neighbors—Russia, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan—were implicated in fueling the conflict.
In 1997, fighting largely came to an end through a power-sharing agreement that placed the Islamic/democratic opposition into government positions previously the exclusive prerogative of former communists. The agreement, though, has not led to peace or prosperity in Tajikistan. The country remains desperately poor. With 50,000 to 100,000 killed during the 1990s and at least a half million living as refugees outside the country—or internally displaced persons—many families and their social networks were left in disarray, infrastructures were broken and social services were unavailable.
Today there is evidence of efforts to rebuild infrastructures and provide critical services, but the power-sharing agreement has come to look increasingly threadbare. The former communists not only retained dominance over the government but have also slowly pushed the former opposition—as, for instance, civil servants and academicians—out of the positions, which they gained at the time of the agreement.
It appears that few of the various conflicts in the 1992-97 civil war were actually resolved and ethnic, regional and religious tensions remain. Those frustrated with the situation—including the government’s inability to rectify it—have advocated new directions, such as closer alliances with powerful neighbors (such as China, Russia, or Iran), adoption of political Islam, or closer connections to the West, among other options. Militarized Islamist groups operating in parts of the countryside have enabled the government to exploit fears about their strength and insodoing curry favor with the United States, Russia and other potential allies in the “global war on terror”. In these volatile circumstances, civil war could well erupt again. This would not only be tragic for Tajikistan, but could have negative spillover consequences for Central Asia as a whole. For example, the countries surrounding Tajikistan—Kazakhstan, China, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan—are ill-equipped to deal with the refugee flows that would accompany renewed fighting.
It was under these circumstances that we initiated a multiyear collaborative project with the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies that would build on peace-making efforts already underway. Tajikistan has boasted major success in ensuring the legitimacy of political activities of religious and non-religious politicians and the Constitution of Tajikistan guarantees citizens the right to unite and to establish political parties of a democratic, religious or secular nature. And yet the ability to do so is hampered by distrust among groups and a legacy of repressive state control of civil society.
Noting at the onset that the unfinished process of compromise between secular and religious forces posed a significant barrier to peace-building, our project used several conflict resolution practices—facilitation, education, training and research—to promote dialogue among religious and civic leaders. Relatedly, we also sought to increase the capacity of university officials and faculty to respond to tensions over the role of religious and secular ideologies in a nation struggling to define itself.
THE IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION
While doing our work we were provided an entrée to better understand the complexities of Tajikistan’s post civil war conditions and issues; in particular, the impact of globalization. A colleague captured her awareness of this on our initial project visit:
We arrived in Dushanbe on Sunday. The contrast between the airport in Almaty and Dushanbe could not have been greater. In Almaty, the gleaming new facility suggested that Kazakhstan not only had resources but was also anticipating international visitors and wanted to facilitate their travel. In Dushanbe, the airport was a small, dusty and chaotic affair.
As we walked the streets of Almaty and Dushanbe, it was evident at many levels, that Kazakhstan is a global player while Tajikistan is not. Changes in the global political economy have rendered Tajikistan unable to jumpstart development by exploiting water (its major natural resource) and vulnerable to the social ravages of increasing out-migration of Tajik men seeking employment. These pose different, though related, challenges.
Tajikistan ranks fourth in the world in its capacity for hydroelectric power and efforts have been underway to develop this highly valued resource. However, water resources in Central Asia are complicated. The headwater countries in the region are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They are both interested in river flow to provide hydroelectric power, a major resource that would make Tajikistan a global player and also in using water for agriculture, especially in the north of Tajikistan. Downstream users—e.g., Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—need water for irrigation. They are invested in blocking the development of hydroelectric dams that might limit access to the water supply, especially during the growing season. On the one hand, Tajik officials are willing to consider development scenarios that would benefit all in the region. On the other hand, some ask why water, as a commodity, should be treated any differently from oil. In any case, lacking the economic and political clout of its neighbors, Tajikistan has found it difficult to secure the international funding needed to develop hydroelectric capacity and is wary of agreeing to deeply asymmetrical partnerships with their most powerful neighbors, such as Russia or China, whose interests in diversifying their own access to energy are no secret.
Tajikistan’s marginalization in the global economy, combined with abrupt economic changes after the Soviet pullout and the effects of the civil war, have left the economy in a shambles. Social networks are overwhelmed by poverty. Migrant labor has significantly disrupted families and yet, it would be hard not to choose given the limited option. As a case in point, every spring an overwhelming majority of people living in Khoji-Bogh, a northern mountain village, leave to seek seasonal jobs in Russia. In a few months they earn as much as $1000, compared to only $10 a month in Tajikistan.
At the very time when recovery from the civil war requires strengthening family and community networks, the departure of key family members—and many have no plans to return—has profoundly altered the nature of “family.” For instance, many young women are left to fulfill the complex role of daughter-in-law—especially to contribute to household and farm labor—without the support of a spouse. Women who find themselves heading a household can confront unfamiliar responsibilities, such as paying taxes or making decisions about a child’s future. Fear of being abandoned by the laboring family member saddens everyone, including children and the reality can leave a wife in a troubling predicament—legally married but with no prospects of spousal support. In communities where the relationships among Islamic law, customary practice and state law are far from clear, women’s rights to autonomy, maintenance or divorce can be difficult to determine and challenging to claim and obtain. Local distrust of the state, combined with a turbulent politics surrounding Islamic practice, make the terrain especially treacherous for Tajikistani women struggling to cope and also for local and national leaders who seek to establish policy. As abandonment, poverty and abuse trap women in desperate situations, women’s organizations have begun to demand action.
NEW ROLES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
It is clear that conflict resolution intervenors could have a role in helping Tajikistan become a global player with hydroelectric power and addressing the changing nature of the family. Beginning in 1997, Tajik leaders engaged in numerous attempts to establish regional agreements on water rights and uses, yet a comprehensive, mutually satisfying approach remains elusive. The regional conflict over water is sometimes a proxy for other conflicts, such as insecurity in border regions, illegal trafficking of people and drugs or the struggle among political leaders for regional domination. Sorting out these interrelated conflicts and developing a sequenced approach to their resolution requires highly-skilled conflict resolution practitioners. Moreover, a third party without vested interest in the water itself might be most effective, especially if they could combine facilitation with technology transfer. Our conversations with Tajikistanis in that sector suggested that bringing a big player such as the U.S. into the discussions could realign the regional power dynamics that have marginalized Tajikistan and stymied resolution. That said, uncoupling a U.S. third party role from any quid pro quo demands—especially for military bases or access—would be crucial for American participation to work. A new U.S. administration might go this route, knowing that improved water management in the region would benefit U.S. interests in Afghanistan.
Intervention in family relations is even trickier. Although the underlying problem of migrant labor will only be resolved by growth in the Tajikistan economy, one can imagine numerous projects that would begin to address the issues. For instance, the laws and norms that govern marriage need to be clarified and publicized so that the wives of migrant workers can access support, sue for divorce and protect themselves from abusive relatives. The cooperation of local religious and government officials is a key factor as is national leadership. The relative roles of secular, customary and Islamic principles in guiding family relationships are currently a topic of heated debate among Tajikistani policy-makers and a conflict resolution process might facilitate a discussion. Great sensitivity is required and any U.S. role would have to be carefully constructed to avoid the appearance of disrespect for religious practice that U.S. actions post-9/11 have routinely engendered. In the course of the project we took one step along this difficult path by presenting information to Islamic scholars on the multiple ways in which secular and Islamic legal traditions co-exist in countries worldwide. The presentation had to be framed explicitly not as an attempt to value or promote one approach over another but rather to provide informational examples to stimulate a conversation among Tajikistanis.
Women’s organizations at all levels can assist in public information campaigns designed to reach women in rural areas. Through Counterpart International, USAID mounted several programs to empower women in the late 1990s. In recent years, local NGOs have taken the lead. Modar, for example, produces training materials on human rights and offers seminars along with radio programs. Established by professional women economists, physicians, demographers and academics, Komila creates and distributes information about health and family violence and also offers psychological support. More than fifty other gender-related NGOs form a network coordinated by the Women in Development (WID) Bureau.
Much work is being done in Tajikistan to strengthen opportunities for fuller participation of the public in policy development and decision-making by the state. Political parties, academic institutions, mass-media and NGOs are all actively engaged—in their own ways and reflecting their own interests—to improve the lives of the people. NGOs are perhaps the most organized and best known for this important work as they have established partnerships with civil and political groups. Any conflict resolution initiatives would want to collaborate with them to build on the work already underway. At the same time, to be effective, American-led efforts would need to be mindful of the U.S. position in the global political economy and the region and would need to create ways for local, national and international systems to work together.
Sandra I. Cheldelin (scheldel@gmu.edu) is Vernon M. and Minnie I. Lynch Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR, http://icar.gmu.edu). Susan F. Hirsch (shirsch4@gmu.edu) is Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution and Anthropology at ICAR. This article was first published in print and citations have been removed due to space limitations, but are available from the authors.
