Conflict Resolution Networks
BY SUSAN ALLEN NAN
The rise of the network society has shaped both conflict and conflict resolution. Conflict between the global network of capital exchange and locally rooted meaning can be seen in many international conflicts today. Castells argues that many of today’s conflicts are protests (by Zapatistas, American militia, Aum Shinrikyo, al-Qaeda, and the anti-globalization movement) against lack of representation of particular local identities in the global network.
With the rise of the network society, the last decade has given birth to dozens of conflict resolution focused networks. These are more or less formal groups of individuals and organizations that focus on preventing and resolving international conflicts through “track two” or unofficial diplomatic approaches. With Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution research assistants Maneshka Eliatamby, Vandy Kanyako, and Mark Wilson, and with the support of a research grant from the US Agency for International Development, I completed a study of a varied set of these networks in 2007. The most interesting conclusions focus on the related dynamics of 1) network vitality and 2) the inclusivity and exclusivity of networks.
NET WORK VITALITY
Some conflict resolution networks are global in scope while others are focused specifically on conflict in a particular region. It is logical that conflict resolution networks with a regional focus will change as conflict in that region changes.
International conflicts change over time. Conflicts have different characteristics when tensions first develop, as violence escalates, as parties engage in all out war, when a ceasefire is reached without a final settlement, a settlement is reached but not yet fully implemented, and during post-conflict peacebuilding.
International conflict resolution efforts must adapt as conflicts change. For example, facilitating multiple sets of direct talks amongst leaders, influentials, and grassroots individuals on both sides of the conflict may prove useful when tensions first develop or when violence first escalates. Such efforts may be impossible during war.
As conflict resolution activities change, so do the contributions possible from conflict resolution networks. There may be a greater need for sharing information about an emerging conflict, as tensions are first developing, and, as violence begins to escalate, a need to appropriately synchronize intermediary efforts. During post-conflict peacebuilding, a focus on working directly with the human rights, development, and related sectors could prove most beneficial.
Because of the dynamism of conflicts—not to mention the shifts that may occur with funding, member interests, and global trends or events—a related dynamism within conflict resolution networks is not surprising. What is striking, however, is another sort of change in conflict resolution networks. They tend to shift cyclically from a focus on consensus building and clarifying their goals, work, structure, and norms to a focus on flexibility and adapting to a diversity of resources, knowledge, contacts, activities, and interests.
Conflict resolution networks focus on being both flexible (i.e. including new people, looking at new goals as conflicts change, adapting to shifting funding environments, adjusting meeting procedures as violence escalates, etc.) and clear (i.e. defining the boundaries of who is in the network, limiting the focus of the network, agreeing on set operating procedures, etc.). In one dynamic, networks go through consensus building and focus on being clear in order to develop shared conceptions of the network. In another dynamic, networks go through evolution and being flexible in order to adapt to changes. These dynamics repeat cyclically.
This cycle of flexibility-clarity reflects the network vitality of conflict resolution networks. It may also represent a third way for networks to facilitate peacebuilding processes that combines the benefits of two network models. David Wilsford contrasts the good information f low, porous boundaries and flexibility of natural science networks made possible by the strong common understanding of what the problems are that focus these networks, with the poor information f low and rigid, non-porous boundaries of the healthcare policy arena. These latter boundaries reflect a lack of common understanding of what the problems are, as well as uncertain contingencies in the policy arena. Conflict resolution networks do involve contingencies similar to those in the policy arena, such as uncertainties around the actions of conflict parties in regards to signing a ceasefire agreement, keeping a ceasefire agreement, agreeing to a political settlement, etc. But, conflict resolution networks cyclically build clarity on the common problems of focus while flexibly adapting to conflict developments.
INCLU SIVITY AND EXCLU SIVITY
The concepts of inclusivity and exclusivity in networks can best be understood in contrast with each other. In reality, conflict resolution networks present a blend of inclusive and exclusive characteristics, but, for illustrative purposes, imagine a fictitious network that is entirely inclusive and one that is entirely exclusive. These networks differ in terms of their network nodes, central nodes, governance, structure, boundaries, action, flow, power relationships, emphasis, focus, discussion, and core values.
The nodes of highly inclusive networks are composed of individuals, with central nodes playing facilitating roles. An inclusive network is governed by democratic and transparent decision making. Its network structure is decentralized, flat, and fluid, and the network has no boundaries. It takes action representatively, taking time to consult broadly. The flow of the network relies upon trust and relationships. Inclusive networks tend to empower the least powerful. These networks also emphasize dynamic interconnectedness. Its focus shifts as dynamic goals are driven by values. Discussion in the network can be seen as a conversation amongst diverse voices, and the core value of the network is its inclusion of these voices.
In contrast, the highly exclusive network’s nodes are members in positions, with central nodes playing leadership roles. The exclusive network is governed by charismatic leadership. Its structure is centralized, hierarchical, and rigid. The boundaries of the network are clear. Guided by the network’s flow of authority and rules, an exclusive network is able to take action quickly. It reinforces existing power structures, and places emphasis on control. The exclusive network’s focus is on a specific set of goals. Discussion in exclusive networks can be seen as a debate between limited perspectives. The core value of these networks is its single voice.
No conflict resolution network follows one or the other of these models in their entirety; rather, conflict resolution networks draw on both models while emphasizing inclusivity. For example, the Caucasus Forum—a very inclusive network of local conflict resolution practitioners in the Caucasus region—regards individuals as people in a flat and fluid structure, as opposed to representatives of their organizations. It has open boundaries, allowing anyone to join who identifies with the overall network mission and values the range of considerations and discussion amongst diverse voices. In person meetings allow the flow of trust and relationships. Even with all this inclusivity, the network still establishes a headquarters (although that rotates from city to city and country to country on an annual basis), and empowers its headquarters and other sub-groups to act quickly on behalf of the network between meetings. For example, a sub-group established by that network brought together combat veterans from various conflicts across the Caucasus for peacebuilding workshops.
This blend of mostly inclusive and limited exclusive dynamics may be pragmatic for conflict resolution networks. However, the core values that drive conflict resolution practice are much more in line with inclusive rather than exclusive network characteristics. Conflict resolution practitioners value inclusivity by seeking to include all relevant parties in conflict resolution processes, and by conceiving of peace processes as a much broader dilemma than simply political elites negotiating political settlements. The diversity of concerns of grassroots individuals, including reconciliation and trauma healing, fall within the broader more inclusive concerns of conflict resolution. The conflict resolution focus on creatively trying to meet everyone’s basic human needs, not necessarily following law-based political precedents, resonates with inclusive network members. Similarly, in conflict resolution practice, trust and relationship building are crucial. Thus, as inclusivity is what conflict resolution practitioners preach, it may not be surprising that conflict resolution networks tend to exemplify more inclusive characteristics. It seems the members of conflict resolution networks are generally practicing what they preach.
The inclusive bent in conflict resolution networks may also be more effective for the goals of these networks. Conflict resolution networks are formed for three major reasons:
- “To shift the international community towards a culture of [conflict] prevention as opposed to reaction
- To address specific urgent problems arising from an ongoing conflict/s
- To work together across organizations, regions, and or fields of expertise to advance peacebuilding.”
Each of these goals is best served by primarily inclusive network characteristics. Enacting a broad cultural change, addressing complex urgent problems, and advancing peacebuilding efforts are all activities that benefit from the meaningful engagement of multiple diverse voices, flexibility, trust, and relationships that enable autonomous individuals to work together. Ideally, a network vitality alternately engaging consensus building and flexible evolution will allow conflict resolution networks to draw on the strengths of both inclusive and exclusive networks.
Susan Allen Nan (snan@gmu.edu) is assistant professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution (http://icar.gmu.edu). This article was first published in print and citations have been removed due to space limitations, but are available from the author.
