Religious Identity, Democracy & the 2007 Nigerian Elections
BY JOHN N. PADEN
Religious affiliation is one of many identities that may be mobilized for political purposes. Succession to leadership in democratic systems is always a political process, and symbol management is an integral part of this process. In pluralistic societies, the ability to balance the ticket, or to convince a multi-ethnic constituency that a leader is “one of them,” is crucial.
With a population of about 140 million, Nigeria is not only the giant of Africa, but by far the largest country in the world that is approximately half Muslim and half Christian. Historically, most Muslims lived in the northern part of the country and most of the Christians lived in the south. A so-called Middle Belt is mixed in terms of ethnoreligious identities, but historically was part of the north. The central challenge for Nigeria has always been to design mechanisms that link the various regions of the country, within a system of democratic federalism. Thus, Nigeria is a critical case study in a clash of civilizations theory. If successful, Nigeria may serve as a model for Muslim- Christian political accommodation and understanding.
As preparations emerge for Nigerian national elections in April 2007, the issues of religious constituencies and use of religious symbolism in the struggle for leadership are not far from the surface. For the past eight years, President Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar have been viewed as maintaining a southern-Christian and northern-Muslim balance. Many Nigerians now hope to rotate this balance by returning the presidency to the Muslim north.
An underlying issue in any election process is basic respect for constitutional principles and guidelines. In the Nigerian case, this requires that in order to win the presidency, a candidate must win at least 25 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the 36 states. (If no one achieves this, there is a run-off between the two highest vote recipients.) Hence, the need for cross-regional alliances is obvious. There is also a two term limit therefore the current president cannot succeed himself.
While there are approximately 35 registered political parties throughout Nigeria, many of these are highly localized. The main incumbent party, People’s Democratic Party, has chosen as its presidential candidate Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim and governor of Katsina state. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) selected vice presidential candidate Mr. Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian and governor of Bayelsa state.
The main opposition party, All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) has selected former military head of state Muhammadu Buhari as its presidential candidate. The Democratic People’s Party chose the governor of Sokoto, Attahiru Bafarawa. The Action Congress has opted for Vice President Atiku Abubakar. All four of these major party candidates are northern Muslims. The expectation is that each will select a southern Christian as a running mate.
The success or failure of the election process in Nigeria this spring will have enormous implications for Africa and for larger issues of democracy and cultural pluralism in a global context. Nigeria is home to the sixth largest Muslim population in the world. It is also one of the largest oil producers in the world. Billions of windfall petrodollars are fueling the political scene and the stakes are high both domestically and internationally. In historical perspective, Nigeria’s transition from military rule to democratic federalism in 1999 will only be complete after a peaceful transfer of executive and legislative powers through the April elections and the inauguration of a new government on May 29, 2007.
PAST ELECTION LESSONS FOR 2007
As per the 1999 elections that enabled a shift from military to civilian rule, the key to success is that incumbents must have the will to turn over power. The 2007 election is characterized by a majority of incumbents at all levels who are restricted from self-succession by term limits. Will they accept this constitutional limitation on power, or willfully try to subvert it in one way or another? Can incumbents be persuaded to play by the rules and hence strengthen institutions?
One of the keys to the 1999 transition was the generally agreed upon principle of immunity from prosecution, which constitutionally applies to current officials, but does not protect those no longer serving in public office. It is one thing to be without a job in 2007 and another to be indicted for economic and financial crimes. The Nigerian political system will need wisdom and judicious insight to balance the need for accountability with the need for system stability. This will be especially problematic if the indictments are perceived to be politically motivated.
Another lesson learned from recent elections is that the management of religious identity symbols is crucial to a smooth transition. This is usually done through a balance of identities at the top of the ticket through representation of each north/south and Muslim/Christian. Nigeria has banned ethnic and religious political parties since colonial times, and every effort should be made to ensure that party labels do not mask such identities. The media and the party campaign managers should be extremely sensitive to avoiding religious stereotypes of any kind. It is especially important to neutralize inflammatory rhetoric surrounding the Shari’a issue, if it should surface during the campaigns. Since such issues are usually legal and constitutional in nature, they are appropriately left to the judicial branch. The natural tendency during national elections is to downplay such religious symbols because of the need for cross-regional and inter-faith alliances, however a strong civil society capacity for conflict resolution shock absorbers should be ready in case of religious violence.
Alliance building is key to a stable transition. The importance of national coalition behavior and power sharing cannot be overestimated. While the constitutional requirements for a national base of political parties are clear, the tendency in 1999 and 2003 (and thus far in 2007) has been to relax this provision in the run-up to the election. A tighter enforcement of this provision by the Independent National Electoral Commission would encourage more coalition behavior at an earlier stage prior to the election. Clearly, there are those in the political system—often incumbents—who discourage this because a fragmentation of parties facilitates a divide and conquer strategy. Coalition behavior is not only the key to electoral success, it is also essential to system stability.
The role of an independent and effective judiciary is critical both before and after elections. If grassroots constituents feel they cannot get justice in the courts, they may try to get it in the streets. The slogan, “ justice delayed is justice denied” comes to mind. It is crucial that post election appeals be handled promptly— the delay of more than two years in the appeals from the 2003 election cannot serve as precedent for 2007. Such appeals should be transparent to the media and general public. The rule of law message by opposition leaders after the 2003 elections may have averted serious system disruption. But such goodwill cannot be counted on in the future, especially if the judiciary is perceived to be biased.
Positioning of the police and military is another crucial aspect of a free and fair election in 2007. While all police and military are federal under constitutional law, how they are deployed and instructed in terms of engagement will determine how they are perceived at the local levels. Special training for election police should be encouraged and auxiliary police should be recruited. The use of police and military by incumbents was a source of tension and official opposition protest during the 2003 elections. The 1999 and 2003 ban on all vehicular traffic on election day was a wise precaution, although in practice there were many instances where incumbent vehicles were allowed to transport party stalwarts (and money) between polling places.
The neutrality of the police and military is a precondition for free and fair elections. In election day tensions between the PDP and ANPP parties in Kano in 2003, there were vigilantes ready to burn down police stations if it was perceived that the police had intervened on behalf of the incumbents. Fortunately, the legitimacy of the Kano election was recognized by all and a crisis was averted.
Muslim identities in the north are part and parcel of regional politics. How such issues and symbols are managed in the national context may well determine whether Nigeria stays together as a nation on a path toward democratic federalism. Good leadership is the key to conflict management, and ideally, leadership is generated by electoral systems. The emphasis on money politics in Nigeria has discouraged many in the Muslim areas and beyond from engaging in the negative and sometimes brutal world of party politics. Yet, many worthy aspirants seem willing to persist.
The challenge for Nigeria, as the largest country in the world with a half-Muslim/ half-Christian population, will be to set an example of ahl al-kitab (people of the book), where people of different religious identities learn from each other, rather than as a prelude to a clash of civilizations. The 2007 elections provide both opportunity and danger in fulfilling this historic task.
John N. Paden (jpaden@gmu.edu) is Clarence Robinson Professor of International Studies and professor of public and international affairs (http://pia.gmu.edu/). He served as an international monitor/observer for presidential elections in Nigeria in 1999 and 2003 and has written a book, Faith and Politics: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World (DC, US Institute of Peace Press, 2008) on the issue.
